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*J. Crim. L. 382  The provisions of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 have been no
stranger to scrutiny since enactment in regard to the partial defences to murder, but none 
more so than the sexual infidelity exclusion that somehow appeared sitting neatly within s. 
55(6)(c). The exclusion means that when considering if the loss of self-control had a 
qualifying trigger, one must disregard things done or said which constituted sexual 
infidelity. This must have come as quite a surprise to the Law Commission, as its report 
preceding this change to the law eventually formulated by the government did not mention 
an exclusion of this kind, and it does not appear to be a welcomed change. Of course, the 
reasoning underpinning such a bold move is sound; a sole confession of sexual infidelity 
and subsequent killing from anger and jealousy should not partially excuse such actions. 
The problem is that such circumstances are rare. In most cases involving an admission of 
sexual infidelity, there is often much more to the situation than meets the eye. This 
comment considers the repercussions of having this exclusion included in the 2009 Act and 
how it will actually affect both genders, not just jealous men. 
 Why this particular exclusion? 
Hansard is a good place to start as to how and why this exclusion came to be: 
We are not trying to legislate away people's natural and normal upset, concern and anger 
about these circumstances, but we do not accept that that itself ought to lead to reducing 
a murder finding.1 
The point is to increase the standard at which one can act out of anger before a qualifying 
trigger will have been met, with particular regard to male killers acting on the notion of 
ownership of their partners.2 With this is mind, the language used is bound to cause a host 
of problems. Reed and Wake described ‘interpretational difficulties’3 which would be *J. 
Crim. L. 383  encountered, and I am inclined to agree. It was suggested that the word 
‘disregarded’ should be replaced with ‘insufficient’,4 which would have more adequately 
portrayed that the point is for sexual infidelity alone not to be a qualifying trigger. As Leigh 
points out,5 the law would have been clearer if the legislation itself had expressed this. 
What seems to have been forgotten is that context is critical, and to view any other 
circumstances without shedding light on infidelity claims too would give a very blurred 
picture of what had happened. 
 Evidently, the exclusion of sexual infidelity could also be thought of in connection with the 
considered desire for revenge exclusion, as such motives can often be interpreted in these 
situations.6 One must wonder, if the rationale of the sexual infidelity exclusion is because 
the jealousy motive largely relates to revenge, why the considered desire for revenge 
exclusion alone did not suffice. This is also the problem foreseen for battered women who 
kill their abuser, where some amount of premeditation is sometimes evident.7 Deciding 
what amounts to a ‘considered’ desire for revenge is another concept which the courts will 
be left to determine. This was noted by Ashworth: 
A desire for revenge that may fairly be described as fleeting or instinctive stands at one end 
of a spectrum, and a ‘considered desire for revenge’ is well on the way to the other end of 
that spectrum.8 
 Courts' interpretation 
In the recent case of R v Clinton,9 it was established that sexual infidelity may in fact be the 
background, just not the qualifying trigger itself. In this case, a man killed his partner after 
he found out that not only had she started a relationship with another man, but she had 
also boasted to sleeping with many more, had expressed amusement at his looking at 
suicide websites and told him he did not have the courage to commit such an act. She also 
told him that she would not only leave him, but leave their children with him too. What a 
shame that the courts have had to establish this when the government recently had the 
perfect opportunity to provide clarity in this area. Several other issues came to light in this 
case too, all surrounding this particular exclusion. What if the infidelity claim was made to 
hurt the other party? Could a boast of sleeping with five other men be taken seriously? It 
would be unreasonable for an intentional lie to be considered as a qualifying trigger, but not 
*J. Crim. L. 384  a truthful statement. One of the most important points made was why
this form of betrayal has been singled out, whilst other forms of disloyalty and humiliation 
of sufficient gravity may constitute a qualifying trigger. That being said, most of us realise 
that a relationship comes complete with the prospect of being one of two things--happy or 
heartbroken. Therefore, if the possibility of the relationship ending badly can be foreseen 
or half-expected, why should this be not only a reason to act irrationally, but reason 
enough to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter? It may seem a very pessimistic way 
to look at the issue, but optimism will not make out a defence here. Having high 
expectations for a relationship and an absolute level of trust which is then shattered will not 
create an exception to the exclusion if it stands alone, no matter how much worse it may 
make the infidelity appear. 
 What constitutes infidelity? 
Sexual infidelity implies there is an ongoing relationship--without the relationship, no level 
of loyalty or faithfulness can be expected or presumed. Therefore if this exclusion is taken 
literally, cases where a relationship was near enough at an end will be wavering on a very 
fine line. Of course, it would be absurd to think that a jury could find someone to have a 
justifiable sense of been seriously wronged if his or her former partner was involved in any 
such activity after a break-up, but technically it would be there for consideration if the 
exclusion did not apply. Through this perspective, the word ‘infidelity’ itself is problematic 
because there is uncertainty as to which relationships acquire such a bond of loyalty and at 
what point towards the end of the relationship this bond is severed. The word ‘sexual’ is as 
much a problem. What if a woman told her partner she was completely in love with another 
man, although no physical intimacy had taken place yet? Surely he could experience the 
same emotions as if she had just told him she had been intimate with another man, yet the 
exclusion would not apply. The term ‘sexual infidelity’ is not defined or explained within the 
new law, and this has been justifiably criticised.10 
In discussing the exclusions chosen,11 Withey12 highlights the fact that sexual infidelity 
has been excluded when it is actually something the public would normally sympathise with, 
whilst honour killings, which receive no compassion from the public, have not. As Edwards 
points out,13 it is strange how juries can be relied upon to disqualify honour killings, but 
not cases of sexual infidelity. 
*J. Crim. L. 385  Women and sexual jealousy--an unlikely combination
An interesting perspective comes from Fitz-Gibbon and Pickering14 with regard to how 
such cases of men killing women over claims of infidelity and the like play out, noting how 
such trials often turn into a slanderfest: 
Women killed by their male partners are often stereotyped according to their alleged 
infidelity, nagging, or other undesirable characteristic.15 
Conversely, this exact occurrence also happens in the case of battered women who kill 
their abusers, with the victims becoming merely violence personified, and no one seems to 
mind. The gender bias in this area of the law is nothing new. Commentators before the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 illustrated the bias towards men and the anger-related 
defence of provocation. Now there is the concern that the changes have gone too far in the 
other direction. What must be remembered is that it was not only men seeking to rely on 
sexual infidelity to make out a successful provocation plea. There are cases where women 
have acted violently in such situations. The difference between cases of men and women 
killing in circumstances of sexual infidelity seems to be motive. Men kill in a jealous rage 
which may stem from their dated perception of women as property. On the other hand, in 
some cases, women seem to act out in violence as a form of hurting their male 
counterparts to the extent that they themselves have been hurt, with physical harm 
substituting for emotional hurt. It would appear that women care much less about the 
physical acts involved in infidelity, and more about the man they love having strong 
feelings for someone else, which takes us back to the issue of what constitutes infidelity in 
the first place. 
Consider the case of Eileen Smith,16 who shot her husband in the hip (a wound which later 
proved fatal), telling police she wanted to ‘pepper his behind’ to teach him a lesson and 
stop him from leaving her. She had been married to her husband for 30 years. She became 
increasingly depressed and threatened to commit suicide, when not only did he embark 
upon an affair, but he actually moved his other woman into an outbuilding on their property. 
Note that the conduct sparking the violent outburst is still sexual infidelity, although the 
defendant did not seem to intend to do anything more than give her husband a serious 
wound and a warning. She loved him and she did not want him dead; she just wanted him 
 to stop the affair and come back to her. 
This is not always the case with women scorned. In the case of R v Challen (Georgina 
Sarah),17 a woman took a hammer to her husband's head whilst he sat at the table eating 
his dinner, after suspecting he was to meet another woman the next day. She had been 
suspicious of her husband's unfaithfulness for several years, suspicions which were often 
*J. Crim. L. 386  accurate. She had left him on a previous occasion, moving into a
property she had bought, only to ask him for a reconciliation a few months later. She 
started to check some social networking sites he used, and discovered he had made 
arrangements to meet another woman. Unbeknownst to her, he had called this woman to 
cancel the arrangement. Although she appeared to act out of jealousy, there was no 
suggestion of any sexual infidelity having actually taken place (on that occasion), and for 
that reason it can only be assumed that it was the mere fact that the husband wanted to 
start a relationship with someone else, or spend time with another woman, which angered 
her. It was not the threat to their sexual relationship that wounded her; she was feeling 
emotionally upset and hurt at the realisation that her feelings for him were not 
reciprocated. 
In the case of R v Sangha,18 a woman found out her husband of 22 years had not only 
begun a relationship with another woman, but the other woman had also become pregnant. 
She stabbed him and then herself. There was a background of intolerable physical and 
mental abuse, and she had attempted suicide before, but her realisation of the extent of 
her husband's betrayal was the straw that broke the camel's back. After considering the 
gender issues involved, there appears to be an extra level to these particular 
circumstances. Should two questions be asked here: (1) how can any of these events be 
viewed without the context of the sexual infidelity; and (2) does the fact that the victim 
impregnated this ‘other woman’ not make the situation a tad more serious? Surely the fact 
that the defendant's husband was facing the prospect of being responsible for another 
woman's child should be part of the ‘circumstances of D’, even though it is related to an act 
of sexual infidelity? Perhaps such a great breach of trust should be given more scope for 
compassionate excuse. 
 Does the sexual infidelity exclusion achieve its purpose? 
The government's rationale for bringing in the sexual infidelity exclusion was obviously to 
prevent cases slipping through to jury consideration where there were aggravating 
features of a revelation of infidelity, for example, in the case of Sanchez Williams,19 where 
the defendant who had a history of sexual possessiveness beat his ex-girlfriend to death in 
front of their three-year-old daughter, stopping on four occasions to return the child to her 
room. However, excluding all situations involving the jealous/sexual infidelity component 
in order to achieve this does seem somewhat unsound. Already R v Clinton20 has shown 
that the new two-limbed defence is flawed. Where we go from here is something that the 
courts may need to address in the very near future. Interestingly, in Scotland, one of the 
only ways to plead provocation successfully is to *J. Crim. L. 387  show there was an act 
or admission of sexual infidelity.21 Is it right for such an act or admission to be completely 
excluded south of the border? In R v Mellentin,22 it was held that taunting a man about 
sexual infidelity or performance does involve striking at his character at its most vulnerable. 
If this is truly the case, to exclude it is to ignore completely some emotion-driven aspects 
 of human frailty. Norrie was quick to point this out: 
Sympathy for human frailty is rejected in favour of recognition of imperfectly justified 
anger.23 
The essence of the defence of provocation was always as a concession to human frailty; a 
way to prevent the maximum sentence being passed on those whom one could feel 
sympathy for because their actions and the situation they were reacting to was beyond 
their control. The point of abolishing the partial defence of provocation and replacing it was 
to give the law clarity and ensure that emotions other than mere anger would be 
considered, not to change its fundamental reason for existing. Of course, the courts will 
need to establish where boundaries lie in regard to taunts in the context of sexual infidelity. 
Reed and Wake have further explored this point, particularly as to how sexual infidelity can 
ever be detached from taunts relating not only to infidelity, but also inadequacy: 
It may be troublesome to disentangle the nature and import of excessive taunts relating to 
cheating, inadequacy and disaffection.24 
In such cases, the whole picture really cannot be seen without the consideration of the 
sexual infidelity factor. This does not mean the sexual infidelity is the qualifying 
trigger--merely that the sexual infidelity is a significant component to the emotional 
disturbance the defendant suffered at the time of the killing. Baker and Zhao have taken a 
different view to this.25 They believe that being able to consider sexual infidelity when 
investigating the defendant's circumstances is letting the disqualified event in ‘through the 
back door’.26 This is also noted by Leigh.27 Arguably, a qualifying trigger should be 
established on the basis of something other than mere confession or observing sexual 
infidelity. But how can a trigger be established at all without looking at all the 
circumstances? It cannot be compartmentalised without creating injustice. 
*J. Crim. L. 388  Conclusion
As regards R v Clinton,28 Baker and Zhao suggest that the victim's taunts about the 
defendant considering suicide should have been viewed without the knowledge that the 
defendant was already upset about her infidelity. However, if he had been upset already 
because he was unfairly dismissed from his employment earlier that day, clearly this would 
have been considered as part of the circumstances surrounding the event. Baker and Zhao 
also suggest that an ordinary person would not kill over taunts on contemplating suicide; 
but the ordinary person is not suicidal. Being suicidal is nonetheless a circumstance which 
would make such acts more provocative to that person. Consequently, with all the 
circumstances taken into account, it may well be thought of as a qualifying trigger. As long 
as the infidelity alone does not constitute the qualifying trigger, then surely this is enough 
to meet the objectives of what the new law tries to accomplish by implementing such an 
exclusion at all? Leigh comments that this is indeed the result of the Clinton decision: 
The effect of all of this is that sexual infidelity is only to be disregarded where it stands 
alone in isolation from a qualifying trigger.29 
Finding a case where the sexual infidelity component is completely separate from other 
events will no doubt be difficult, therefore reference to it in the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 seems purely academic. It will in reality only cover a small number of cases,30 those 
of pure sexual jealousy and anger of an almost possessive nature--possibly making it a 
virtually moot point for women who kill in such circumstances.31 It may be assumed that 
the safeguards in place within the 2009 Act could have frustrated any attempt at a 
successful plea. Indeed, not only would the judge have the power to withdraw the defence, 
any reasonable jury left to debate the issue could surely be trusted to make a moral and 
just decision. 
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